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Abstract 
Opening of local communication means of technological devices 
towards networks available to the public, supervision of devices, and remote 
technological device administration are the characteristics of modern 
automation. As a result of this process, the intrusion of unwanted elements 
from the Internet into control networks occurs. Therefore, in 
communication and control networks we have to build in active means to 
insure access to individual technological process components.    
This contribution is focused on the insurance of control system data 
communication via neural network technologies in connection with classical 
methods used in expert systems. The solution proposed defines a way of 
data element identification in transfer networks, solves the transformation of 
their parameters for neural network input, and defines the type and 
architecture of a suitable neural network. This is supported by experiments 
with various architecture types and neural network activation functions and 
followed by subsequent real environment tests. A functional system 
proposal with possible practical application is the result. The determination 
of parameters for unambiguous data packet identification, proposal and 
transformation of the data for neural network input are the most significant 
outcomes of the contribution. The final experimentally verified proposal 
itself, as well as subsequent neural network implementation, represent 
a suitable way for utilization of such a network type in the field. The 
integration scheme proposal of the dedicated system into real production 
structure and the execution of the conversion of data elements representing 
the data packet parameters to be used as an input into the proposed neural 
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network are the main contributions of related research. In addition, software 
able to carry out conversions for a random file size with continuous 
communication in the data network recorded was created. Determining data 
transfer parameters capable of specifying unambiguously the data packets’ 
parameters, and subsequently the neural network proposal, able to detect 
and control the communication network operation according to parameters 
selected by us, are essential parts of this contribution as well. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
IPS  Intrusion prevention system 
TCP  Transmission control protocol 
IDS  Intrusion detection system 
UDP  User datagram protocol  
ACL  Access control list  
IPSec  Internet protocol security 
DOS  Denial of service  
IP  Internet protocol 
DNS  Domain name system 
SSH  Secure shell 
SSL  Secure sockets layer 
ICMP  Internet control message protocol 
IT   Information technology 
HTTP  Hypertext transfer protocol 
HTTPS  Secure hypertext transfer protocol  
FTP  File transfer protocol 
MAC  Media access control 
NN  Neural Network 
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INTRODUCTION 
Production process controls are being replaced practically everywhere 
by discrete automated control systems. This dynamic development is 
rapidly increasing the importance of automation control systems and 
processes. The information transfer to the control system has to be as 
immediate as possible; a direct on-line connection is preferred. To work 
properly, the control system itself needs the information on results and 
feedback. All these parts necessarily require properly working 
communication channels capable of transferring the essential information 
quickly and reliably. The more complex the control system is, the higher the 
requirements for its control are. In the case of extensive systems, the control 
computer is utilized as a control system. This way it can be used for 
controlling even very complex systems in real time. The control process is 
based on current information on the values of input and controlled 
quantities, on the state of individual system parts and other relevant 
information. Communication channels represented by the file of protocols 
as well as physical transfer media are used to transfer the values. 
 In building and operating the communication networks, their 
functionality is commonly emphasized. If the characters of their utilization 
or legislation do not require meeting security aspects, the information 
security is understood as the extension of the system functionality and not 
as its part. This is caused by the unawareness as well as by the fact that the 
security measures lower the system functionality and make its use more 
complicated.  
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It is also obvious that the effort to control complex and accelerating 
processes properly necessarily leads to the requirement for faster and better 
information transfer.  
This contribution focuses on the proposal and solution to the system 
utilizing artificial intelligence methods to investigate control systems’ 
communication issues and data transfer. The application of neural networks 
in cooperation with expert control of data transfer represents one of the 
possible solutions leading to quality communication channels of control 
systems.   
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1. DATA TRANSFER IN NUMERIC SYSTEMS CONTROL  
Communication systems control represents a large field of issues. To 
ensure the control and communication of automation systems via 
communication interface, the utilization of many technical and program 
means is necessary. The control structure of this communication together 
with technical and program means is defined by the network architecture.  
One of the best solutions is to implement the attempt to classify the issue 
into the hierarchically arranged layers. There are many decomposition 
methods representing various layer models of network architecture. Such 
models provide higher flexibility in terms of changes in network 
architecture. At present, mostly TCP/IP Protocols based communication is 
utilized. In the case of conventional calculation systems, it is a commonly 
used protocol; however, this is not true for control systems. The elements of 
technological processes such as PLC, regulators, action members, sensors, 
etc. commonly utilize industrial protocols based on other communication 
ways than classical IT informatics (18). The current trend is to interconnect 
the industrial network types and classical Ethernet technology which results 
in various super-structural technologies for TCP/IP Protocols dealing with 
the compatibility of automated and classical calculation systems, however, 
these bring errors and risks to automation networks as well  (72). 
1.1 Communication standards of control and production systems  
To control the automation systems in terms of transfer infrastructure, it 
is necessary to meet higher quality parameters than by a common 
communication in computer networks (30). It is mainly the possibility of 
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high-speed communication and determination transfers in time-critical 
input-output information for processes and systems control. Classical 
communication interfaces included in IEC61158 or in S50.02 ISA 
Standards (Actual Sensor interface, CAN-bus, Controlnet, etc.) are 
proposed directly for the needs of control (21). Nevertheless, the 
separateness of the system represents a disadvantage. The disadvantage can 
be eliminated by the implementation of new protocols for automation 
networks communication (72). Then, by the interconnection of automation 
and classical IT networks we will acquire the following: 
 integration to generally available networks with classification to 
Internet/Intranet, the possibility of distant configuration, 
 higher accessible speeds, the possibility of transferring larger data 
packages,  
 the possibility of addressing and controlling more devices at larger 
distances,  
 the possibility of developing homogenous communication 
networks, i.e. automation and data networks in one protocol,  
 the subsequent possibility of developing MES systems, online 
control, firmware update, errors correction, etc. 
1.1.1 Automation networks protocols encapsulation  
The mechanism of data transfer in automation networks in renowned 
companies (Siemens, Rockwell) is usually proprietary. Nevertheless, the 
utilization of ICP/IP Protocol model is the same. Well introduced 1-4 
Ethernet technologies standards provide the common base. This means that 
IEEE 802.xx technologies (Layer 1), CSMA/CD Access method (Layer 2), 
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IP (Internet Protocol, Layer 3) and TCP and UDP Protocols (Layer 4) are 
utilized for data transfer. Besides common elements, some application layer 
(Layer 7) protocols were also accepted, such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and SNMP Simple Network 
Management Protocol (26). In general, the basic disadvantage of the 
classical IT communication is network reaction time, e.g. standard reaction 
time of the Ethernet is approximately 100ms. In local networks with lower 
number of devices it is about 20ms. Therefore, in specific cases UDP 
Protocol instead of TCP Protocol is used for technological processes control 
(reaction 10 ms), and technology of direct MAC addressing in local 
segments (1ms) (33). 
Commonly utilized accesses are as follows: 
 Ethernet/IP  
Industrial Ethernet Protocol developed by Rockwell Automation is 
specified as IEC 61158 (28). For encapsulation of packages 
TCP/IP Communication System is used, while the super-structural 
Layer 7 is built by CIP Protocol. This Protocol directly supports 
automation interface of DeviceNet, and ControlNet. The position 
of the aforementioned CIP Protocol within seven-layer RM OSI 
model and positions of TCP and UDP Protocols is illustrated in 
Figure (28). 
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Fig. 1  CIP encapsulation in TCP/IP 
 Modbus-TCP  
The protocol superstructure for Modbus automation networks 
control developed by Modicon Company represents the 
superstructure of TCP/IP Protocols and corresponds to the seventh 
(application) RM OSI layer. Figure 2 (Fig. 2 Modbus 
encapsulation) shows the position of Modbus-TCP Protocol to RM 
OSI model position. In the model shown it represents the seventh 
(application) layer and utilizes all protocol services of the third and 
fourth layers represented by TP and IP Protocols (32). 
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Fig. 2 Modbus encapsulation 
 ProfiNET 
ProfiNET is utilized mainly in devices used by Siemens Company 
(Symatic NET) and it is standardized via IEC 61158 and IEC 
61784. It is based on the Ethernet technology complemented by the 
mechanisms for Real-time Control of processes. Especially 
services of SNMP, HTTP and TELNET from TCP/IP Protocols are 
utilized.  (40) 
Besides the aforementioned standards, there are more automation 
protocols standards (e.g. CC-Link, EtherCat, SERCOS III, Versatile 
Automation Random Access Network, IEEE 1588, etc.) (69). The 
mentioned protocols, and Profinet (Symatic) in particular, are the most 
common. 
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Note to automation networks security  
The common sign of modern automation is to open local 
communication means of technological devices towards publicly available 
networks, or possibly the compatibility of communication protocols. On-
line supervision of devices and remote administration of technological 
devices result in the intrusion of unwanted elements from the Internet to 
control networks, which leads to the requirement of considering the 
unauthorized access to the network as well. Therefore, it is necessary to 
implement security means for the access to individual technological process 
components in communication and control networks.  
 According to PA Consulting Group Agency, the average amount of 
damage caused by viruses in automation networks is approximately €1.5 
mil. The incidents and damages (registered by CERT Institute from 2000 to 
2006) show an increase of 50-100% a year.  Protection against these 
incidents shall therefore be a part of all automation and production systems 
strategy proposals (34). 
1.2 Reference structure model of communication protocols 
 
The reference model of network architecture of open systems 
interconnection is accepted as an international standard. It is defined by ISO 
(International Standards Organization), registered as ISO 7498 Standard, or 
RM OSI Standard (Fig. 3 ISO/OSI model) (19). The model comprises 
specifications of individual layers and freely describes the interfaces among 
the layers, especially the communication and transport protocols origin as 
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independent ISO standards, or standards of other institutions (IEEE, CCITT, 
etc.) (83). 
The three bottom layers are network dependent layers, since their 
functions depend on the specific type of the network. These layers can see 
only a part or all actual network topology. The three upper layers belong to 
application-oriented layers, for which the network type is transparent and 
they are used as program support for application processes. The interface 
among these groups is made by the transport layer.  
An entity is a process unit, which is indicated according to its layer 
affiliation (application entities, presentation entities); the entities on the 
same level are indicated as peer entities. Entities in N layer implement the 
services used by N+1 layer. In this case, the N layer is called a service 
provider and subsequently the N+1 layer is called a service user. To 
exchange the control and data information, the established buffers indicated 
as SAP (service access points) are used, e.g. for communication of two 
entities from neighbouring layers (83). 
The entire model, as well as its specifications, is described in sources 
(19), (24).  
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Fig. 3 ISO/OSI model 
 
A communication unit comprises several parts: 
 Interface Control Information ICI 
 useful data – Service Data Unit SDU 
Together they build an Interface Data Unit (IDU). Data flows 
transported among subjects within RM OSI are illustrated in Fig. 4 (Fig. 4 
Data flow in ISO/OSI model). 
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Fig. 4 Data flow in ISO/OSI model 
1.3 Protocols of RM OSI 3rd and 4th layers  
The protocol can be defined as a communication regulation for 
systems requiring carrying out the data exchange via some communication 
channel (24). The main point of this contribution is to propose a system 
with a neural network module serving to ensure the systems communication 
via TCP/IP network. Obviously, the most commonly used protocols in this 
case are TCP, IP and UDP Protocols. The perfect comprehension of 
communication via these protocols is crucial. According to the assignment 
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of communication protocols to individual ISO/OSI model layers, IP 
Protocol (network layer) is on the lowest level and ensures the processes 
related to addressing within the network.    
The description of individual areas in the IP Dataprogram Package 
structure is not necessary. They are strictly given and can be obtained from 
related standards (37, 38). Nevertheless, it is necessary to know the function 
and importance of individual areas, namely in the case of directing 
packages, or in the case of identifying their origins and targets. Regarding 
the data, the basic filtration of transferred data is carried out.  The areas of 
source IP address and destination IP address can also be one of the input 
data for learning and then for subsequent deciding on neural network.   
Since it is the basic transport protocol, practically the whole 
communication within the networks based on TCP/IP is executed under this 
protocol (84). Source and destination address in the headings of TCP and IP 
Packages is one of the significant characteristics utilized by the evaluation 
of data packets’ correctness and security.  
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2. SECURITY OF CONTROL SYSTEMS IN DATA TRANSFER 
At present, not only is performance important, but data transfer 
security and secure data access are significant as well. The protection of 
confidential data is possible in some specific places – interface of 
private/public side network, remote access, or remote administration of 
devices, servers’ security, etc. Methods of protection correspond to the 
place of implementation and usually in other ways, which can be combined. 
Considering the function principle of the Internet network, the 
utilization of the Internet as a transfer medium is quite suitable. Protocols 
used for communication originated directly from remote data transfer. 
Gradually, with network development and increase of users´ techniques and 
connected client stations, the necessity of transferred data protection 
occurred. At present, communication security can be understood as a whole 
system of protection elements (administration of passwords, access levels, 
communication coding, security gates, hidden networks, certification 
authorities, etc.) serving to avoid unauthorized access to the system or 
personal computer network. We have a number of standards and protocols 
at our disposal; and by applying the protocols, we can avoid the majority of 
attacks.    
The security of systems is frequently not taken as a complex. This 
means that there is usually quite a strong protection by the input to the local 
system from the Internet; however, the communication itself is executed in 
the unsecured (unencoded) channel. We provide the possible attacker space 
for data acquisition when they can bug the communication.  After the 
 21 
analysis of the Ethernet frameworks of such bugged communication, it is 
possible to acquire all the data transferred, including passwords.   
It may seem that these issue relate only to the field of computers and 
computer technology, understood as a personal computer, however, it is 
essential to realize that modern production lines and systems (e.g. presses, 
machining centres, etc.) are directly connected to the Internet and their 
producer is, via remote access, directly capable of modifying the parameters 
and recording the operational software. We can imagine that damaged 
software in a machining centre can result in production failure, which can 
bring enormous economic loss. 
2.1 Categories of communication systems attacks 
In any system, not only the computer system, such a situation can 
occur (sooner or later it almost always happens), that functionality will be 
damaged by an attacker’s activity to change the system properties in favour 
of other parties. Obviously, the system is damaged, or if the system works 
comparatively well and on standard, besides functions required by us it 
carries out other activities as well. In case it did not come to the change of 
system behaviour, it could have come to the system data change or misuse. 
Both cases represent a considerable problem to be taken care of.  
Communication can be destroyed in two ways. First, by damaging 
communication transfer channels either by physical damage of transfer, or 
by the modification of transferred packets. Secondly, damage can occur by 
overloading the communication network nodes via appropriate frequency of 
meaningless requirements and orders. The system usually denies such 
requirements, nevertheless, regarding the quantity, and then it is not capable 
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to carry out specific activities (DOS attack). Considering the servers’ 
performance and technologies that allow splitting the load on multiple 
servers, or possibly filtrating and modifying the transfer channel zone 
width, such an attack from only one computer is practically impossible. 
Distributed DOS, i.e. dDOS, is widely spread. In this case, the attack is 
executed from the number of calculation systems connected to the network. 
Protection is practically impossible.   
The amount of attacks on information and control systems is 
significant; therefore, the field of research and investigation is large as well.  
In general, it is possible to divide the infiltration attempts into 
communication networks into two basic groups, active and passive attacks.    
Passive attacks on communication networks basically only monitor the 
network operation. Their defectiveness lies in the misuse of acquired data in 
further activities. In this case, as the title also suggests, no modification of 
transferred data happens.   
Active attacks represent the attempt to change the transferred data and 
provide the possibility of communication set damage. They are the 
following attacks:  
 eavesdropping, replay attack 
 Man-in-the-Middle attack 
 password attacks 
 Integrity attack 
 Identity spoofing, IP address spoofing  
 Attack on accessibility/availability (Denial Of Services, Distributed 
DOS).  
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The result of such damage of the communication infrastructure means 
practically destroying communication means. The impact of such an attack 
is enormous. Systems are without control, supervision and hence the 
consequences can frequently be fatal.  
Basically, according to the main method used, it is possible to classify 
these technologies into IP Protocol Misuse and TCP Protocol Misuse. 
Misuse of IP Protocol: 
 Pretended IP addresses  
 Misuse of TTL  
Misuse of TCP Protocol: 
 SYN Flooding 
 Backscatter 
Misuse of ARP Protocol 
 ARP Flooding 
 MAC Flooding 
Misuse of ICMP  
 Smurfing 
 Pretended ICMP packages  
Misuse of UDP 
 ‘Fraggle’ attack  
2.1.1 Special techniques of data transfer 
 Covert Channels 
This method represents a simple but efficient mechanism for data 
exchange among the systems without any recognition of the activity by the 
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firewall or IDS system. The technique is based on the principle of utilizing 
such communication TCP Protocol ports, which are not usually blocked via 
security systems (TCPP53, UDP/53, etc.).  Apart from the aforementioned, 
for such a communication, it is possible to use common packages as well, 
while the covered data are transferred directly in “harmless” data 
represented by certain changes in TCP or UDP packages headings.  
This data transfer technique is mostly resistant to all standard firewalls 
and IDS systems. The revelation of covered channels is possible only by 
constant analysis of network communication. However, a large amount of 
data can be transferred in the network, therefore, considering real conditions 
such an analysis is almost impossible.  
A possible solution is the application of a device controlled by a neural 
network (called an intelligent firewall), which can process the behaviour 
formulas of the communication set in transfer. The process is obviously 
demanding and requires calculations and it is not possible to guarantee the 
revelation of all hidden communication. 
 Out Of Band Communication 
It is a special technique of data exchange, in which apparently 
unrelated data in information systems are utilized, e.g. the change of access 
rights of a specific file. If there are changes continuously being carried out 
(denial/prohibition of registration, permission/authorization of registration 
in the file, change of property right, etc.), by monitoring these changes, it is 
possible to transfer data. These data exchange techniques are very complex 
and it is practically impossible to reveal them, due to the fact, that for such a 
data exchange transfer various hardware and software elements can be 
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combined. They can also very “exotic” combinations, e.g. the 
aforementioned change of access rights together with the change of 
processor frequency, or possibly with occupying or not occupying some 
address in the memory, etc.  
2.2 Ways of industrial systems security 
All systems connected to the computer network are exposed to the 
misuse by an unauthorized person via the Internet. In this case, we should 
not consider only “personal computers”, in which an office agenda is 
carried out. It is necessary to include the control computers of technological 
processes, production lines, etc. as well. In such cases, the protection of 
computer networks against danger takes on a completely different 
dimension. In general, we can divide the network protection into two main 
parts. The first one is the protection of exchanged data, the other one the 
protection of systems (80). 
 The protection of exchanged data means the process by which we 
replace the commonly used communication protocols by their 
“safer” format. Therefore, it is suitable to use safe HTTPS instead 
of HTTP. Similar situations are possible in practically all 
communications via networks (76). 
The protection of systems against an attack represents a self-contained 
file of means and activities ensuring the information systems security 
against attacks from the outside of the network. Firewall, honeypots and 
IDS systems are the basic elements.   
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2.1.2 Firewall 
 
It represents the basic security element. It checks the network traffic 
among zones with various degrees of trust (Internet –LAN).  
They can be classified according to used technology as follows: 
 IP filter – the simplest firewall. It is a “blocker” of Internet 
communication. In this type, there are defined rules on 
communication permission or prohibition on individual ports. The 
operations on the network, that are not prohibited, are therefore 
permitted. Low flexibility of such a solution is a disadvantage, as 
well as the fact that, due to security, it is necessary to forbid a large 
amount of input-output ports. 
 Status firewall – or status IP filter is a more advanced technology 
of network security. This device checks the data flow and 
communication of higher layer protocols of ISO/OSI model, i.e.  
TCP and UDP Protocols. The standard regime of such a device 
permits any inside-out network communication out, and forbids 
outside-in Internet communication. Hence, it permits only the 
packages related to inside-out communication. 
 Proxy server – superstructure of the status firewall. It is a program, 
which carries out the filtration on the application layer directly for 
specific applications. For example a standard port 110 
(downloading mails, POP Protocol) can be accessible from the 
network only by the program working with electronic mail. The 
communication via other program is prohibited in this port. 
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Firewalls are frequently utilized also by more sophisticated security 
devices, e.g. IPS, to prepare provisions against the attack found. 
2.1.3 IDS 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can be defined as a file of tools, 
methods and sources helping reveal, record or announce the attempts on 
network intrusions and attacks (72).  
IDS, i.e. intrusion detection systems operate on the network layer and 
usually they are passive systems which are not aimed at attack prevention. 
The primary purpose of IDS developing is to reveal the attack, not to 
execute appropriate measures to avoid it. Systems trying to avoid attacks are 
called Intrusion Prevention System - IPS. Regarding development, some of 
the functions have grown up to prevention measures against attacks, and 
then some IDS become active. They were renamed as Intrusion Detection 
and Prevention Systems – IDPS (70). Any use of prevention functions 
should be indicated in IDS records.   
Patterns of abnormal behaviour are many; however, in general, they 
include unneeded, harmful or illegal activities occurring within the system. 
We distinguish two main methods of intrusions detection, i.e. misuse 
detection and anomaly detection – AD (43). 
According to the principle of activity, intrusions detection can be 
divided into two groups:   
 statistical anomaly detection  
 patterns comparison. 
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3. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT NEURAL NETWORKS 
TECHNOLOGIES  
 
Artificial neural networks attempt to model the abilities to process 
information in the form of a nervous system. Due to fast computer 
technologies development, they are largely utilized not only in experimental 
tasks, but in practice as well. Application tasks such as information 
processing, patterns classification, optimization issues in the field of 
control, and prediction tasks exist in various fields of industry and it is 
possible to execute them via neural networks. 
Neural network is a massive parallel processor with the tendency to 
preserve experimental knowledge and its further utilization (5). It imitates 
the human brain in two aspects: 
 knowledge is collected in neural networks in the course of learning  
 inter-neural connections (synaptic scaling) are used on the basis of 
knowledge  
Neuron is the basic element in neural networks (7). Compared to 
human neurons, it is possible to develop (simulate) much faster neurons 
than the human ones. Nevertheless, the issue is the simulation of such an 
amount of neurons and their connections, which is similar to human brain. 
The number of neurons in the human brain is approximately 1011 to 1014, 
while there are 103 to 104 of their connections to each neuron. It is 
a massive parallel structure, which is not possible to simulate in reality with 
current computer technologies.  
In the implementation and study of neural networks, we distinguish 
three basic activities: 
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 theoretical analysis of neural networks – mathematical analysis of 
neural networks activities and their analysis from the point of 
dynamic systems  
 Simulation of neural networks – simulation of neural networks via 
computer systems. The field includes the phase of neural networks 
and the process called neural network learning. The process of 
learning, however, demands quite a lot of calculations. 
 Implementation of neural networks – implementation of learnt 
neural network into a result form suitable for practical use (neural 
chip).   
3.1 Neural structure  
The neuron is the basic element as well as the basic process unit in 
neural networks (6). 
Neurons are built by five main parts:  
 input 
 neuron threshold  
 activation function  
 neuron output function 
 synaptic scaling. 
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Fig. 5 Mathematical model of neuron 
 
Regarding the synapses flow, we can divide the neurons into:  
 pre-synaptic (source) – are located in the direction in front of the 
synopsis  
 post-synaptic (destination) – in the direction behind the synopsis. 
 
To indicate the synaptic scaling we can use indication wij,, where “i” 
indicates post-synaptic neuron and “j” indicates pre-synaptic neuron. It is 
the synopsis coming out of “j” neuron and directing towards “i” neuron.  
The neuron’s input is the function of individual inputs coming from 
pre-synaptic neurons. If we consider it is the sum of inputs with specific 
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scaling, then we can express the input into i-the neuron having N of pre-
synoptic neurons by the following relation:   
ij
N
1=j
iji Θ+ouw=in     [1] 
where wi,j is synoptic scaling and ouj are neuron outputs, while Θi is i-
neuron’s threshold (5).  
The aforementioned equation can be rewritten as:  
j
N
0=j
iji ouw=in               [2] 
where wio =  ϴi a ouo= 1 or -1. The threshold is the neuron’s input from the 
surroundings (i.e. not from other neurons). That is in case there are no 
inputs into the i-neuron investigated from other neurons j = 1,...., N, then ϴi 
threshold represents the input into the neuron. Neurons having such an input 
are called sigma neurons (5). 
Neural network has to be considered as a dynamic system, i.e. 
dependant on time. We can talk about the neuron state in time t, or in time 
t+1. Neuron’s activation function is the function of the neuron input ini(t). 
The state of the neuron is defined by the variable xi such as follows 
 ii inf=x     [3] 
We call the function  f as the activation function of the neuron. 
Basically, the neuron’s output/axon is represented by the calculated value 
from the application of the activation function to sum of inputs, weighed by 
synoptic scaling. 
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It is possible to build an even more complex connection, where the 
combinations of inputs represent the input to the neuron (e.g. in the form
jiij yyw ). Nevertheless, they are rarely used in practice due to demanding 
complex calculations. 
Scaling wij is an adjustable part of neural networks. They are acquired 
by the process called neural network learning (or neural network training). 
Neural network training is carried out by the training set of data comprising 
combinations of input vectors and required output/axon vectors. There exist, 
however, networks with necessary learning (6). 
From the mathematical point of view we can say that the neurons 
behave as a function (6). The neurons change their input values ini(t) (in 
time t) to limited output values via the activation function.  
Sigmoidal function (S curve) is the most frequently used. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Sigmoid function 
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3.1.1 Topology of neural networks 
In general, neural networks are built by neurons laid in layers, so that 
we can connect the outputs of one layer’s neurons to the inputs of the output 
layer. We can describe the structure of these networks by a random oriented 
graph via the apices being represented by the neurons and by the edges 
representing their connections.  
 
Fig. 7  NN topology 
In such a neural network type the layers are called as follows (5): 
 Input layer (0 layer), where there is usually data processing carried 
out. It is for the input data distribution from the surroundings to 
other neurons in other layers.  
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 Covered layer (1~ N-1 layers), in which neurons receive the input 
data from other neurons through threshold connections and their 
outputs continue to further possible layers. 
 Output layer (N layer) is similar to the covered layer, however, the 
output goes out from the neural network. 
Neurons classified into individual layers have the layer characteristics.  
We can further divide the neural networks due to the direction of the 
signal spread by the synapses, and mainly according to the connections 
orientation:  
 Feed-forward neural networks, where the signal is spread only in 
one direction, i.e. the input layer has only outputs and the output 
layer only receives data from lower neurons. 
 Recurrent neural networks, where the output neurons represent 
also the input neurons and subsequently the layers are input and 
output at the same time. In this case it is very difficult to 
distinguish the input and output layers.  
 Similarly, in neural networks the signal can spread among 
individual neurons by different ways.  
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4. SUBJECT MATTER FORMULATION   
Information technologies represent complex relations, and therefore it 
is not possible to eliminate the danger of control systems damage by an 
unauthorized, incorrect input either from the inside or outside networks.  
Various technologies are used to protect the systems, e.g. Firewall, IDS, 
IPS, antivirus systems. The technologies develop and, also, people develop 
the systems which are able to deal with the issues and evaluate the data 
without being supervised physically by a person. 
One possible way is to develop a system capable of executing complex 
calculations similar to human brain operations. There are various expert 
systems. They have one disadvantage: they are able to deal with various 
issues in the field and they can prove the solution as well; however, in the 
case of a false answer, it is necessary to modify the rules from the operator 
so that the further operation results in a correct solution. These systems are 
low in flexibility in situations where input information comprises a certain 
degree of uncertainty.  
Hence the neural networks represent a shift in the systems 
development. They are able to learn and, if trained correctly, they bring 
excellent results. Their information, however, is a distributed form of 
arrangement, represented by neuron connection synoptic scaling (7). This 
property means that even a detailed analysis cannot determine how the 
neural network came to the result. Development of a hybrid system using 
the strengths of both types could be the solution (10). 
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Neural networks, or possibly hybrid systems, seem to be an optimal 
solution to the need of replacing an expert when defining the new rules by 
the change of inputs. The theory of neural networks is elaborate; there are 
several sources available. In general, they can be used for classification and 
functional approximation or mapping the functions by using a lot of training 
data, where the systems with clearly defined rules (e.g. expert systems) fail 
(7). There are many applications based on the utilization of various types of 
neural networks. Despite this fact, there are only few functional and really 
applicable solutions connecting the neural network directly with IDS or IPS 
systems (14, 15). The first devices of the kind were published in 1986 (16). 
As far as their principle is concerned, they were based on the utilization of 
statistical methods and they were looking the anomalies up in the data 
flows. Denning and Neumann introduced their system model called MIDAS 
(29) in 1988; it was an expert system made with the use of LISP language. 
The neural networks implementation in the anomalies evaluation was first 
published by Lunt in 1993 (36). He developed a system for anomalies 
detection called “Next-generation Intrusion Detection Expert System 
(NIDES)”. As the system title suggests, it was mostly an expert system. In 
1991 in the University of California they developed a prototype called 
“Distributed intrusion detection system (DIDS)” (25).  Nevertheless, this 
was again an expert system.  
This contribution is aimed at proposing a dedicated system capable of 
securing the systems within the communication network against threats 
from outside. The connection of classical firewall functionality and 
advantages of neural networks represents the solution including the 
strengths of both. Obviously, all over the world there are systems to prevent 
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attacks on local networks (IDS, NIDS, and IPS). The efforts to implement 
various techniques to define possible attacks, as well as predict them, are 
clear (11), (12), (13).  These methods are mainly determined for prevention, 
or possibly for detection. They mostly do not have the possibility of directly 
influencing the running communication. The security of networks is ensured 
via dedicated filtrating devices – firewalls, however, the devices have no 
possibility to react directly and dynamically on possible changes in the 
input conditions. The issue can be solved by the connection of these two 
technologies. Nevertheless, the need of an operator to define the rules 
remains their disadvantage, as both of them are expert systems. 
The proposed system should be able to eliminate attacks on data 
networks via an active filter represented by a firewall, controlled by IDS 
system in connection to the neural network. The efficiency of the device 
depends on the neural network type,, therefore, it is necessary to select 
a suitable neural network type. The entire product should operate on 
a dedicated industrial system. 
The aims of this contribution can be summarized as follows: 
 analyze the security of control systems communication,  
 analyze possible neural networks utilization by the data transfer 
validation and select a suitable neural network type,   
 propose a functional security system model,  
 via suitable tools, execute the model system of communication 
network security.   
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5. POSSIBILITIES OF NN USE BY SYSTEMS 
COMMUNICATION VALIDATION 
Traditional computers ensuring security of data and automation 
networks, and subsequently the security of industrial, information and 
production systems (firewalls) are based on more or less complex files of 
security rules (68). The data entering such a system are processed as an 
input and output based on one or more rules from the base of rules. The 
base of rules is structured as a file of sequenced logic operators (Boolean). 
In cases where the base of rules becomes larger, and/or more complex, it 
naturally requires a larger processor performance and more system sources. 
In practice, it frequently means that the file of rules represents 
a compromise between the efforts to cover all the possible firewall states by 
rules and by required obtained data penetrability (74). It means that we 
usually sacrifice security in favour of higher penetrability. Besides, 
a frequent intervention of operation personnel in the administration or 
modification of the base of rules is necessary. Obviously, even when it is 
most spread, the base of rules works in the same way of linear processing. 
In addition, besides various limitations in all classical systems, e.g. limited 
capacity of storing space, limited possibilities of logical mathematics, and 
need of demanding complex calculations in extremely large bases of rules, 
in the case of classical firewalls the systems are still static. Their security 
level corresponds proportionally to the operator’s abilities and knowledge. 
Since they are static firewalls, their automated adaptation and learning from 
data flows coming through the data network are not possible. Subsequently, 
the systems do not allow performing of comparisons and analysis of data 
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flows and avoid the pitfalls and security threats, or possibly simplify the 
work of administrators.   
Therefore, it is necessary to dedicate certain sources and means for 
devices’ development; we can call them firewalls with artificial intelligence. 
Such a device represents the connection of a functional neural network and 
classical firewall. The system is then capable of learning from the data 
flows coming through it, or it is possibly able to adapt to changed input 
conditions, and hence ensure higher security requirements. It would also be 
useful to include the requirement of combining various methods of risks 
analysis into the development of the intelligent security system method, 
which would provide a higher degree of functionality and security than 
classical firewalls. In the use of neural networks, it is possible to develop an 
independent intelligent security network system – an intelligent firewall 
comprising the knowledge of possible security risks and threats and a 
system capable of dynamically adapting to possible malfunctions and 
attacks of the communication system, or possibly more complex forms of 
intrusions/infiltrations (exploits, out of band communication, analysis of 
covered communication channels). 
The system, with such a heuristic analysis of data flows, should 
optimally eliminate the shortcomings of classical devices, as well as should 
be able to adapt to the changed input conditions in computer 
communication. This contribution is aimed at proposing and implementing 
a system offering the advantages of neural networks integration into 
a classical IDS security model. The proposal and implementation of 
a suitably selected neural network and its integration into the proposed data 
transfer/transport system is the basic element.  
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5.1 System proposal  
The proposal of the entire system consists of more parts. Individual 
steps of the functional model implementation to ensure the communication 
via neural networks correspond to the stages of the implementation. 
Necessary steps for practical implementation of the proposed system (Fig. 8 
NN system design) can be summarized as follows: 
 necessity (by some suitable way) to implement the main core of the 
security system, 
 propose, carry out and implement the functional model of the 
neural network, meeting the requirements for possible 
implementation as proposed, 
 select a suitable element of active security of the protected 
network, which is able to dynamically change the parameters of 
communication set data transfer on the basis of the neural network 
module’s outputs, 
 implement the solution by suitable software.  
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Fig. 8 NN system design 
 
The field connecting the IDS and NS module is a very simple software 
element best placed on a dedicated system. The component indicated as a 
static firewall can then be placed on another system, either on the dedicated 
system or the system with aggregated communication functions. 
5.2 Proposal of host system 
Regarding the complexity and extent of the subject matter, the 
development of the system itself is beyond the contribution framework. It is 
efficient to choose an existing system as the basis and implement the 
security via neural network as a complement, or possibly a superstructure of 
the system. Obviously, such a system shall meet the following 
requirements: 
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 open system –with the ability to program extending modules,  
 ability to capture packets – IP and TCP/UDP packets represent the 
basis for data transfer in the network, therefore it is necessary to 
grab the packets in the communication network,  
 record of packets –an  important point due to the possibility of 
repeating the learning cycles of a neural network,  
 existence of communication interface – to ensure the active filter 
control of the data transfer in a network (firewall). 
There are more systems to detect security deviations in the 
communication network, however, only a few of them are practically 
utilized. There are particularly the following five software solutions: Snort 
(90), Untangle (91), Bro NIDS (92), Prelude Hybrid IDS (93), OSSEC 
HIDS (94), Flowmatrix NBAD (95). 
Regarding the aforementioned criteria we select IDS Snort licensed by 
GNU GPL as a host system (96).  The system architecture is modular and is 
illustrated in the following scheme (Fig. 9 Architecture of Snort IDS) (96). 
 
Fig. 9 Architecture of Snort IDS 
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The application itself is a variable tool. It allows working in IDS 
regime, regime of grabbing packets or IPS mode. For us it is a host 
application for the module proposed. 
The ability to implement their own evaluation modules of the network 
operation is available in the part of a pre-processor. By a suitable 
complementary module, it is possible to investigate and evaluate anomalies 
within the network communication, and subsequently shift the anomalies 
found as an input to the detection system with pre-set action for the packets 
in question.  
There are three practical regimes of the application mentioned. It can 
work in the following three modes: 
 sniffer mode – by which the data of the monitored communication 
are displayed in the screen, or possibly stored in a file. This 
operation regime is suitable for neural network learning or for data 
acquisition for neural network learning. In the simulated regime we 
can use the stored data for multiple simulation of the network 
system operation. Activation of the system is possible by the order 
on the operator’s console  
/snort -vde  (./snort -vde -l $HOME/log – with storing ) 
 NIDS mode – basic operating mode, by which the monitoring of 
the system network operation with the reaction based on the set of 
defined rules is carried out  
./snort -vde -l $HOME/log 147.175.133.0/24 -c snort.conf 
 inline mode – for the cooperation with firewall and IP tables 
filtration system. (63). 
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Fig. 10  Packet processing algorithm 
For the intended utilization, all operation regimes are important. The 
modes mentioned in points one and three are, however, the most significant 
ones. In the sniffer regime they are suitable for the development of sets for 
learning as well as for neural network testing, and in inline regime, for 
active control of communication data transfer.   
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The packet is the basic information unit in the proposed system. It 
enters the system through the interface of communication monitoring 
(sniffer), which captures the packets and ends them for further processing. 
Monitored data in the network can be redirected to the detection core 
together with the pre-processors, or into the database on the disc for later 
testing or possible analysis.  
The analysis is represented by an insert module of the neural network 
(pre-processor). In this case, when an anomaly in the monitored data flow is 
detected, the output from the NS module is represented by a relevant 
announcement. By this core action, the communication can be blocked via 
IPtables filter kernel, or a constant rule can be defined in the expert 
database of rules.    
The entire detection system scheme comprises two basic components - 
IDS + firewall. The following figure illustrates a practical application of the 
proposed system (Fig. 8 NN system design) into the area production 
environment (Fig. 11 Implementation in real environment).  
A suitable system platform able to connect all the necessary software 
modules is the prerequisite of the function in the detection system of this 
kind. Noting that it is a specialized, dedicated system, a high degree of 
modularity and the ability to modify the program functionality of the entire 
system are necessary.  Therefore, it is suitable to develop the system on 
UNIX platform, Debian Linux in particular. This system also provides the 
possibility of data network penetrability control via IPtables core module 
(82). The module can be inserted as a module into the system core. 
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Fig. 11 Implementation in real environment 
 
We can summarize the configuration of the required software means as 
follows: 
 operation system:  Debian Linux, 
kernel 2.6.28-16-generic 
 host IDS:   Snort 2.8.5.1 
 data flow system control: Netfilter IPtables  
 47 
5.2.1 Determination of parameters for transfer anomalies detection  
Anomaly in the data network operation is represented by a situation in 
which the operation communication parameters deviate from the standard 
behaviour of the transport infrastructure. Network anomalies can occur for 
various reasons: either as physical malfunctions, e.g. network, or as the 
result of unauthorized network intrusions disturbing the standard transfer 
conditions. The method of transfer misuse known as “Misuse detection”, 
the transferred packets is described by an unambiguous pattern (signature) 
(44). Signatures suitably identify the data transferred and, regarding their 
occurrence, we can define the data flow correctness. For correct validation 
of data transfers the monitoring of individual fields’ values in TCP and IP 
protocols is primarily appropriate; this can simply identify the packets 
correctness.     
The data packet content can also be included in the main identification 
parameters. In the data, we can find misuse signatures  for ISO/OSI Model 
higher levels, either random misuses ( e.g. misuses  in data blocks, incorrect 
control orders for devices), or targeted misuses (e.g. attempts to control 
devices in the network, unauthorized data acquisition, DOS attacks, etc.). 
Because of the huge amount of used protocols and sub protocols and their 
combinations, it is suitable to choose determining parameters by the 
selection of data packets parameters. Considering the preliminary analysis 
of possibilities found in references (51) as well as regarding the results of 
(35) and (36), we can propose that in this case we will specify the data 
packets properties by the following parameters: 
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 ID protocol   - protocol type connected with a packet  
 System source port  - TCP/UDP number of source system 
port  
 Destination port   - TCP/UDP number of destination 
system port 
 Source address   - IP address of source system 
 Destination address  - IP address of destination system 
 ICMP type   - ICMP type of a packet 
 Length of transferred data - size of packet data in bytes 
 FLAGS setting   - flags in protocol heading 
 TCP window size  - window size parameter 
5.3 Selection of neural network algorithm 
The neural network is the main core of the operation as well as it is the 
core of the entire system. Despite little research in the field of neural 
networks utilization in data transfer misuses detection, there are these 
practical applications (1, 35, and 46). It is mainly an effort to replace the 
statistic methods commonly used for anomalies evaluation in data transfer 
by a neural network. Further utilization of neural networks in practice is 
described in publication (49), where it is used to detect virus attacks on 
computer systems. A Kohonen network with one input layer is the type of 
neural network here. 
With the application and selection of a suitable neural network type, it 
is necessary to realize the implementation of any neural network has both 
advantages and disadvantages. The flexibility of neural networks is an 
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advantage; in addition, the neural network is able to analyse incomplete 
data. Non-linearity of data flows in communication networks is another 
aspect influencing the selection. Since the neural network output is 
expressed as probability, neural network outputs can subsequently work as 
a certain prediction. Because neural networks can improve their abilities by 
learning, the output information could then be used to generate various 
actions in cases where a prediction is an alert of an attack attempt.     
The disadvantages of a neural network application are basically 
identical as those of other applications. Particularly, the issue of a “black-
box”(7), where we cannot determine the network’s behaviour, as well as its 
output precisely, is a disadvantage. In contrast to classical expert systems, 
for neural networks, it is essential to set the scaling of synapses. The 
network accuracy cannot be determined in the course of learning. Only after 
the process of learning stops is the network able to produce significant 
results. The process of a network’s learning represents another disadvantage 
of neural networks application.  To train the neural network, a large set of 
training data is necessary. In this case, the training data represent an amount 
of sequences of data packets attacks on communication systems. The set 
should be selected properly in order to represent the needed functions 
statistically. Nevertheless, it is quite demanding to acquire such a set of 
data.   
Research in the field of neural networks application by anomalies 
detection in data transfers/transports is carried out in two main directions, or 
we can say that two basic types of neural networks are utilized for the 
purpose. Regarding the sources (44) we can consider a neural network with 
or without controlled learning. In references (52), (53), and (54) the 
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possibilities of applying Self-organized maps are described (Kohonen neural 
network). According to the aforementioned sources, such networks achieve 
more balanced results. They can also detect unknown misuses; however, 
their susceptibility to fail in comparison to other network types in the 
number of known anomalies detections is higher. From the point of view of 
time demands, it represents an algorithm, which is quite time-consuming in 
the process of structure learning. By changing the input vector, all the 
scaling data should be recalculated together with the determination of new 
winning neurons.  
Neural network with controlled learning represent another neural 
network type able to be utilized. The feed forward neural network is the 
basic network type. The architecture is simple and suitable to be used in 
various applications.  
Key properties are as follows: 
 possibility of the network to learn from input signals for required 
output (controlled learning), 
 easy adaptation to input values change,  
 necessity of a lower amount of calculations (in contrast to SOM 
network). 
There are many types of internal arrangements of neural networks, 
either with or without controlled learning. According to sources available 
and utilization required, we select a free-forward neural network with 
learning with backward spread of misuse. This neural network type 
provides sufficient flexibility and applicability for a large scale of tasks, 
where NS technologies can be utilized.    
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5.4 Implementation proposal and learning of network  
The propose system of non-standard data packets detection consists of 
three basic parts: 
1. neural network module, 
2. host IDS system providing interface and support to system 
modules, 
3. expert database of rules in connection with the system so that it can 
actively intervene the data frameworks transferred/transported.   
The block scheme of the entire system can be illustrated as follows:  
 
 
Fig. 12  Block scheme of the proposed system 
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The data packet, entering the system through interface of the device 
for monitoring the data transfer, is the basic transfer element of the system 
proposed (sniffer). Interface (eth0) record the packets and sends them for 
further processing. For recording the packets, the data interface has to be 
switched in a promiscuous mode. In a subsequent step, the interface will 
send the packet either to the neural network module, or, for recording of the 
packet, given in local hard disc database.  
5.4.1 Application equipment for neural networks implementation  
The issue of the proposal and implementation, or possible neural 
networks simulation, is covered by a large scale of application equipment. 
The majority of software is taken as a simulation program, in which neural 
network development is possible. Subsequently, based on the inputs and 
outputs, the learning process is carried out by setting and recording the 
synoptic scaling parameters. There are many applications of the kind, for 
Windows platform we can mention Matlab & Simulink (96), MemBrain NN 
Editor + Simulator (98). Stuttgart Neural Network Simulator is perhaps the 
best known representative (99). For other platforms (UNIX, Mac OS X) we 
can consider e.g. GENESIS Simulator (100). 
All mentioned programs are suitable for proposing and testing the 
parameters. In the case of practical implementation of the model, however, 
we have to often utilize the proprietary implementation using a suitable 
programming language. Regarding the efficiency and possibility of source 
program transfer/transport for various platforms, it is mostly C Language in 
various modifications based on expected final implementation.  
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Considering the expected utilization, for the proposal and modelling 
we shall come out of the file of libraries for neural networks simulation 
available in the form of source codes in C++ language, gcc 4.1 and Tcl/Tk 
8.4. Utilized source codes are freely available in a student version on the 
website (102). 
The possibility of implementing the libraries by the functions for 
neural networks operation in their own program is an advantage. On the 
other hand, compilation demands and following development of the source 
code are disadvantages. Nevertheless, for the proposed implementation it is 
necessary (Fig. 12  Block scheme of the proposed system). In this case, the 
neural network will be part of the whole system of monitoring and data 
transfer control.  
The package of software available (102) comprises the following files 
of source codes and libraries: 
 bp.cpp – represents the main program and program routines for 
developing neural networks data fields  
 bp.h – functions for the program for working with scaling in the 
floating comma mode 
 io.cpp – input-output and formatting functions 
 misc.cpp – functions for manipulation with patterns 
 real.cpp – procedures for operating the scaling values in floating 
comma mode  
 bp.tcl – framework for graphical infrastructure. 
For compilation, we utilize standard system libraries and C Language 
compiler (GNU Compiler Collection) (103) available directly in 
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depositories of the Linux Debian operation system, particularly gcc in 
version 4.x.  
 
Fig. 13 Makefile for gcc 
It is possible to compile the program either in text version, where the 
operation runs in the order line through the standard input (stdin), or 
compile in graphic version using TCL/Tk framework is possible as well 
(104). Installation packages Tcl/Tl in version 8.4 are commonly available in 
the system depositories. After the compilation with Tcl/Tk package and 
using „bp.tcl“ file , the system for modelling looks as follows: 
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Fig. 14  Communication interface for NN design 
5.4.2 Preparation of input data 
The acquisition of input data for neural network learning and testing is 
one of the most important steps. There are more ways to obtain an 
appropriate sample of data sufficiently representing the transport network 
relations.  
First, in the long term, we can monitor the operation in communication 
and control data network.  From these data we can filter a sample 
sufficiently representing the properties required by us (various 
malfunctions/misuses, type of transfer packets, various services, etc.) They 
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are real data of an existing communication system, which is an advantage. 
On the other hand, time consumption and the fact that even after a long time 
no necessary transfer packets types occur in the monitored network at all is 
a disadvantage. 
Development of communication network model, in which we utilize 
an independent system as a data operation generator is another possibility. 
We can generate multiple required states and we are not bound to random 
processes in real operation as in the first possibility, which is an advantage. 
Nevertheless, this is an artificial process different from the real operation in 
real communication network.   
The third possibility is to obtain examples of recorded communication 
from on-line sources. (104). In this case, they are real records from real 
production systems. It is possible to “replay” these records by a specialized 
software (pre unix - tcpreplay) in our network so that it seems it is 
a malfunction/misuse (or possible security failure) directly in the home 
network. However, they have to accommodate the local network parameters 
and regarding the differences in transport networks structure the utilization 
of the entire database available is limited. 
Generating input data 
For data acquisition in neural network experiments we use the 
combination of the first and second possibility as aforementioned. For 
generation, I selected the system by Nsasoft Company called NSauditor 
(105). The application operates with various functionalities, such 
as network audit, network monitoring, netbios audit, MS SQL server audit, 
packets filtration, etc.  
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Fig. 15 Data flow generator 
 
In our testing environment (Fig. 16 Recording of packets) we utilize it 
mainly for data flow emulation from the specific source to the destination 
address in a specific port, as well as for the emulation of non-standard 
network communication. 
Simultaneously, with data communication generation, the data 
operation record module will be integrated and the output will be redirected 
to the packets database on the hard disc. Since at the same time the testing 
system will be connected to the external network, it will result in the 
database comprising standardized network communication, real network 
communication as well as random generated special events from the 
emulator.   
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Fig. 16 Recording of packets 
 
After storing the record of data communication into a database, it is 
necessary to extract the aforementioned values from the sum of data. 
Regarding that the activity should be automated as much as possible, it is 
suitable to develop a software conversion bridge that would be able to 
supply suitable input data directly into the neural network. 
 Data modification should be executed in stages. Step one is to extract 
required values from the entire data package. Then we can afford to ignore 
the service communication records (ARP, RARP communication) as well as 
the irrelevant data. The following step lies in an appropriate representation 
of some elements. 
Particularly, they are the following parameters:  
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ID_PROTOCOL, where we carry out the following transformation:  
ID_PROTOCOL Substitution 
TCP 6 
UDP 17 
ICMP 1 
        TYPE_ICMP, where we carry out the following transformation: 
TYPE_ICMP Substitution 
ECHO 1 
REQUEST 2 
NULL 0 
        FLAGS, where we carry out the following transformation: 
FLAGS Substitution 
No_flags 1 
RST 2 
FIN 3 
PSH 4 
URG 5 
SYN 6 
Other 7 
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GNU AWK script language was selected as a suitable programming 
language  for operation with chains (106). It is a standard language on the 
UNIX/LINUX platform, and it is located directly in the installation 
repositories. The implementation into the system is executed by a simple 
order: 
sudo apt-get update && apt-get install gawk 
From the volume of data monitored for the proposed system we can 
select only ICMP, TCP and UDP packets. It is essential to carry out the 
whole data transformation process as simple and fast as possible. Therefore, 
we implement programs for AWK in executable script for system Bourne 
Shell. By simple redirecting of data flows within the system we can 
subsequently process huge volumes of the communication recorded.  
ICMP transformation (using AWK) 
BEGIN {fill = 0 } 
{ 
if ( index ($0,"(17)")) next 
else  
dlzka = $NF 
typ = substr($15,2,1) 
split ($18,za,".") 
split ($20,ca,".") 
if (index ($0,"")) sluzba = 0 
if (index ($0,"echo")) sluzba = 1 
if (index ($0,"unreachable")) sluzba = 2 
split (ca(4), cabd, ":") 
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printf("%s,%s%s%s%s,%s,%s%s%s%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s\n",typ, 
za(1), za(2), za(3), za(4), fill, ca(1), ca(2), ca(3), cabd(1), 
fill, fill, fill, dlzka, sluzba) 
} 
 
TCP transformation (using AWK) 
is executed similarly as  ICMP.  
BEGIN {fill = 0, conv_flag = 7} 
{ i= 1  
while ( i < NF) {  
hodnota = index ($i, "win")  
if (hodnota == "1") okno = $(i+1)  
++i  
}} 
{ split ($17,dlzka,")" ) 
typ = substr($15,2,1) 
split ($18,z_a_p,".") 
split ($20,c_a_p,".") 
split (c_a_p(5),cport,":") 
split ($21,flags,",") 
if (index (flags(1),".")) conv_flag = 1 
if (index (flags(1),"R")) conv_flag = 2 
if (index (flags(1),"F")) conv_flag = 3 
if (index (flags(1),"P")) conv_flag = 4 
if (index (flags(1),"URG")) conv_flag = 5 
if (index (flags(1),"S")) conv_flag = 6 
printf("%s,%s%s%s%s,%s,%s%s%s%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s\n",typ,z_a_p
(1), z_a_p(2), z_a_p(3), z_a_p(4), z_a_p(5), c_a_p(1), 
c_a_p(2), c_a_p(3), c_a_p(4), cport(1), okno, conv_flag, 
dlzka(1), fill) 
} 
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TCP transformation (using AWK) 
BEGIN {fill = 0} 
{ split ($17,dlzka,")" )} 
{ typ = substr($15,2,2) } 
{ split ($18,z_a_p,".")} 
{ split ($20,c_a_p,".")} 
{ split (c_a_p(5),cport,":")} 
{printf("%s,%s%s%s%s,%s,%s%s%s%s,%s,%s,%s,%s,%s\n",typ,z_a_
p(1),z_a_p(2),z_a_p(3), 
z_a_p(4),z_a_p(5),c_a_p(1),c_a_p(2),c_a_p(3),c_a_p(4),cport(1),
fill,fill,dlzka(1),fill) 
} 
 
Such a way of data extraction from the entire database file of stored 
network communication is essential for the fast generation of necessary data 
for neural network. Optimally, it is possible to achieve automated network 
learning without direct intervention. By unification of all three 
transformations we get a table, which should be extended by one parameter 
important for training learning of the neural network (class). 
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TABLE OF INPUTS FOR NN               Table 1 
ID
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1 1471751309 0 147175134254 0 0 0 44 1 1 
6 62240183148 80 147175134254 2190 8514 4 1500 0 1 
17 19416092 33239 233104778 65535 0 0 1500 0 2 
6 147175130212 2246 19512215120 80 65535 1 40 0 1 
17 13015680151 4262 2242127254 9875 0 0 224 0 1 
1 147175130212 0 10254247189 0 0 0 36 2 2 
  
Regarding the supposed neural network utilization as a classifier, it is 
sufficient to classify the patterns into two groups. In this case, it will be 
enough to divide the packets into correct ones (CLASS = 1) and those that 
will be subject to further testing (CLASS = 2). This is subsequently 
executed by the file of expert rules (Fig. 12  Block scheme of the proposed 
system). It is evident that we can develop another neural network module, 
which will operate only with incorrect packets. Or, possibly we can extend 
the neural network classification into more classes. Nevertheless, regarding 
the variability of input data and investigated issue complexity, this approach 
would represent a more complex proposal extremely demanding in terms of 
a training set and processor calculation time. Finally we convert the tables 
into a format suitable as a neural network input. Since it is a server system 
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operating on a terminal console and taking the operation speed and 
simplicity into account, they will be text values separated by a space.  
1 147175128234 0 255255255255 0 0 0 8 1 1 
17 955215335 15994 14717513511 35420 0 0 61 0 1 
1 14717510832 0 14717512943 0 0 0 44 1 1 
6 14717513337 43066 147175116158 41981 266 4 362 0 2 
6 14717513337 43066 147175116158 41981 266 1 52 0 1 
17 92557475 21608 147175131126 24854 0 0 90 0 1 
1 14717510832 0 14717512925 0 0 0 44 1 1 
17 10254244120 138 10254255255 138 0 0 229 0 1 
6 24212211 50178 147175141249 20437 8192 6 48 0 2 
5.4.3 Neural network implementation 
Network architecture represents the connection of neurons and setting 
of scaling and threshold parameters. Considering the sources studied (7), the 
neural network with one covered layer (3-layer) and a sufficient number of 
covered neurons is always able to simulate binary or continuous functions 
with the accuracy required. In our case we consider nine input and two 
output neurons of the covered layer. Solutions available in sources, 
however, are quite unclear and complicated for practical use. I tried more 
network types empirically with variously sufficient results. 
Data transformation selected 5000 patterns from the running 
communication in the testing environment. Four groups comprising 200 
patterns for network learning and groups comprising 100, 200 and 3000 
patterns for testing were selectively made of the amount. This division was 
necessary due to experimental verification of achieved results for neural 
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networks with various numbers of neurons in the covered layer and 
different activation function for covered and output layers. Standard 
sigmoid activation function was used in all cases as a covered layer 
activation function:  
 
icinii e+1
1=inf=x     [4] 
Besides the sigmoid function also the linear activation function was 
used in various experiments as an activation function of output neurons:  
  iii in=inf=x            [5] 
The same networks with other activation function on the output layer 
had different results, which resulted in a disadvantage for utilizing the linear 
activation function. As an example, we can show the following graphs (Fig. 
17 Learning NN 9-6-2 in linear and logarithmic scale), where the 
introduced network is trained in the same conditions as the network in 
figures (Fig. 18 Learning NN 9-6-2 in linear and logarithmic scale). The 
only difference is that the linear function was used as an activation function 
of the output layer. After 1000 iterations the overall neural network error 
achieved the value of 0.23104. It is a stable value not changing after 
approximately 200 training cycles.  
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Fig. 17 Learning NN 9-6-2 in linear and logarithmic scales 
 
Similar differences occurred in the other experiment (network with 10 
neurons in the covered layer - Fig. 19 Learning NN 9-10-2 in linear and 
logarithmic scale). It showed that,  in general, in the case of neural network 
proposals, higher quality results with sigmoidal activation function in the 
output neuron layer  were achieved. 
The quickprop method based on Newton method was selected as an 
algorithm of the purpose function minimization (75). The method is one of 
the fastest algorithms for neural networks learning.    
Subsequently, we represent the final results achieved for various 
number of covered layer neurons. For better reader friendliness of results 
the network will operate in the classifier regime (CLASS = 1 or 2), network 
output will be in the form (0 1) – group one or (1 0) – group two. In result 
outputs the sigmoidal function for covered and output layers is used as an 
activation function.  
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Neural network 9 – 6 – 2 
 
A file of 60 patterns modified for the required format input was used 
as a training set. The results achieved are insufficient. Even the change of 
network parameters (such as output function, changed initialization scaling 
values, various coefficients of learning parameters, etc.) do not help the 
network achieve the required accuracy for the result  (maximum deviation 
0.1). Network training was stopped after 10,000 cycles.  
For better illustration, the outputs achieved are shown in the following 
graphs. 
 
Fig. 18 Learning NN 9-6-2 in linear and logarithmic scales 
 
For better illustration the graphs comprise ly values up to 2,000 cycles. 
The graph shows that approximately after 1,000 iterations the levels of 
synoptic scaling are stable. The value of the training set absolute deviation 
is stabilized at 0.17905. The number of patterns meeting the required 
tolerance is 66.67%. 
By contrast, the following network testing by the testing patterns 
group showed quite good values of object separation. The total number of 
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patterns in the testing group was 100; the number of samples meeting the 
given tolerance (0.10) in the testing group is 91%. 
Neural network 9 – 10 – 2 
Similarly as the previous, the file of 60 patterns modified for the 
required format input was used as a training set. The achieved results after 
10,000 iterations correspond to the values of the absolute 
malfunction/deviation values 0.1693, while the number of training set 
patterns rose to 68.33%. Nevertheless, the values are insufficient. Similarly, 
by the network parameters change (such as output function, changed 
initialization scaling values, various coefficients of learning parameters, 
etc.) do not help the network achieve the required accuracy in the result  
(maximum tolerable deviation 0.1). The network training was stopped after 
10,000 cycles. And similarly, as in the previous case, for better illustration 
we introduce the outputs achieved in the following graphs. 
 
Fig. 19 Learning NN 9-10-2 in linear and logarithmic scales 
 
 69 
Neural network 9 – 20 – 2 
In this case, the training set is the same as in previous cases, i.e. the 
file of 60 patterns modified for the required format input. In contrast to 
other networks with lower number of covered layer neurons, this network 
achieves very good values. The achieved results after 10,000 iterations 
correspond to the values of the absolute deviation 0.06041, while the 
number of the training set patterns achieving the required tolerance rose to 
96.67%. 
Even by the higher number of iterations the networks training did not 
show better results the 1,000 iterations mentioned. The achieved values of 
malfunctions/deviations in this case meet the requirements for detection 
parameters. The ouputs are shown in the following graphs. 
 
Fig. 20 Learning NN 9-20-2 in linear and logarithmic scales 
The testing group of patterns is identical with the previous ones and 
the number of patterns is 100. The number of samples in the testing group 
which met the given tolerance (0.10) is 98.56%. From these results, it is 
obvious that the best classification ability of the training sample is achieved 
by the neural network with the number of 20 neurons in the covered layer. 
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The experiment to apply the linear activation function for the output layer 
showed approximately similar deviations in the network decision quality as 
in previous cases. Regarding that the required accuracy was achieved, we 
can say that the results introduced as well as the neural network proposal, 
are suitable for the implementation into the system proposed. The 
arrangement of the neural network with 20 covered layer neurons is 
considered to be final. 
5.5 Experimental system verification 
After the end of neural network training, the values of synoptic scaling 
connections were stored and common data introduced to the network input.    
5.5.1 Testing of proposed neural network  
Testing file of patterns comprised 10 incorrect packets, particularly in 
the first case with the experiment of communication by non-standard TCP 
ports.  
For the experiment, I used the sample of size of 3,000 data packets. 
Formatting of input samples was modified according to required 
parameters. The success of incorrect packets recognition achieved 100%.  
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Fig. 21 The output from neural network (non- standard TCP ports) 
Representation of the incorrect packet is executed by the last layer 
neurons output. The following graphical illustration basically represents the 
file of the second neuron values in the third layer (N3-2). In relevant ordinal 
packet numbers, the first neuron gains opposite values. The specific output 
values for the samples are shown in the table. 
NEURAL VALUES OF OUTCOME LAYER (TEST1)           Table 2 
N
eu
ro
n 
Packet number 
163 953 2105 2156 2191 2215 2228 2345 2599 2849 
N 3-1 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.000 0.030 0.095 
N 3-2 1.000 1.000 0.905 0.905 0.905 0.905 0.905 1.000 0.96 0.905 
In the other case, the testing file comprised the same number of 10 
incorrect packets, here the combination of the parameters of tcp window 
non-standard size (smaller than 1028) and incorrectly introduced 
combination of SYN and FIN flags (FLAGS=7). 
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Fig. 22 Output from neural network (non-standard combination Winsize 
and Flags) 
For the experiment I used the same size sample – 3,000 data packets. 
Formatting of input samples was modified according to required 
parameters. The success of incorrect packets recognition in this case 
achieved 90%. Specifically, the packet with ordinal number of 895 was 
incorrectly recognized by the neural network. The results, however, are 
legible and the deviation mentioned is within the tolerance (0.1). It is 
possible to eliminate the shortcoming by improved neural network training, 
or by better selection of patterns in the training set. 
NEURAL VALUES OF OUTCOME LAYER (TEST 2)                   Table 3 
N
eu
ro
n Packet number 
464 895 1342 1486 2350 2441 2559 2611 2635 2968 
N 3-1 0.030 1.000 0.095 0.095 0.095 0.000 0.095 0.095 0.000 0.100 
N 3-2 0.96 0.000 0.905 0.905 0.905 1.000 0.905 0.905 1.000 0.91 
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The results show that the given neural network is able to recognize the 
data packet types in the control and communication networks it was trained 
for with sufficient accuracy. The errors in values represent a certain 
deviation from the values required; however, the information is sufficiently 
legible. 
Regarding the achieved results, we can say that the implemented 
system of data packets identification allows detecting random data 
transferred in the communication network. As seen in graphs Fig. 21 and 
Fig. 22, the type of detected parameters of transfer packets depends on the 
selection of the training set. Since for the generation of the set we use 
software in which transfer parameters of transformation so that they are 
usable as neural network input data, the development and learning of the 
proposed neural network is fast and efficient.  
5.5.2 Possibilities of practical implementation 
The entire neural network proposal considers the conclusions 
mentioned in Chapter 5, particularly in 5.1. Practical implementation lies in 
the development of the complementary program object for the host 
application. In the case of the mentioned application, it is a pre-processor 
including the functions for the operation with the proposed neural network.  
Since the entire neural network is available in C++ Language and the 
standard programming tool for the pre-processor of the mentioned host 
application (90) is the same language, the practical implementation is in the 
utilization of available programming tools. In this case it is the same 
environment as for the programs compilation of the developed neural 
network, particularly compiler of C Language (GNU Compiler Collection) 
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(103) available directly in depositories of Linux Debian operation system, 
in gcc, version 4.x.   
Functions representing the neural network operations are available in 
the appendix in source codes “bp.c”, “ibp.h” (for operation with 16 bit 
scaling values) and “rbp.h” for operation with real scaling values. The 
libraries are based on the source texts mentioned in References (101). 
To develop a pre-processor with the mentioned libraries (functions) we 
utilize the templates available in (63), (64). 
The implementation of the proposed system (Fig. 12  Block scheme of 
the proposed system) assumes besides IDS modules with installed pre-
processor for incorrect packets detection via neural networks also the 
utilization of an external state packet filter, i.e. classical state firewall.  
Practical implementation of the device is represented by a server with 
installed  Iptables component (63)  and  by interface  for dynamic control of  
expert database of LIBNET rules (63), (107).
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6. CONCLUSION 
This contribution provides a solution to the security of control systems 
data communication via neural networks technologies in connection with 
classical methods used in expert systems. As mentioned in the monograph, 
the issue of control systems is a complex process, which, regarding the 
openness and interoperability of transport channels and communication 
systems, is subject to the surroundings’ influence. The proposed 
methodology of the implementation of data communication control system 
defines the identification of data elements in the transport network, solves 
the transformation of their parameters for neural network input as well as 
defines the type and architecture of a suitable neural network. This is 
supported by experiments with various types of architecture and neural 
networks activation functions and subsequently by tests in a real 
environment. The result is a functional proposal with possible practical 
applications. The determination of parameters for unambiguous data 
packets identification, proposal and implementation of these data 
transformation for neural network input are the most important monograph 
benefits. The proposal, verified by experiments and subsequent neural 
network implementation, represents the suitable way of this neural network 
type utilization in dealing with the issue.   
The monograph comprises the analysis results of the subject matter 
(Chapter 3) and analysis of the current state of the issues in the researched 
field (Chapter 2); the main aims were defined (Chapter 5) as well as the 
research itself. Regarding the complexity of the proposed solution, I divide 
the monograph into individual sub-issues. 
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The first stage of the solution lay in the proposal of the system 
structure comprising functionalities necessary for the solution. In our case, 
we propose a modular system, in which the host IDS Snort application is 
utilized. The application proposed is modular, open (from the point of 
modules development) and in the proposal implementation, we are 
supported by the environment provided. The solution, in which we integrate 
the neural network technologies in the proposed system, is the development 
of the module in the part of a pre-processor. The overall integration of the 
proposed system in the control system communication network in practice 
is illustrated in the figure Fig. 11 Implementation in real environment. 
The second stage of the solution is the specification of parameters for 
transfer anomalies detection. Communication of systems in data networks 
lies in the data exchange among individual elements, specified transport 
protocols. The analysis of data elements parameters and determination of 
unambiguous identifiers is introduced in Chapter 5.2.1. For this utilization, 
it is considered necessary to excavate the list of parameters so that they 
describe the running transfer sufficiently.  The mentioned process of 
parameters selection serving as the input to the proposed neural network is 
then elaborated in detail in the Chapter 5.4.2.  
The proposal of neural network module type and architecture suitable 
for determined parameters detection in the communication flow is the 
essential part of the monograph (Chapter 5.4). Regarding the wide scale of 
neural networks architecture types, the selection of a certain specific type is 
quite complicated. I came to the decision on the basis of the sources studied 
and partially on the basis of my own experience. The neural network 
topology selection (Chapter 5.3) with feed forward neural network with 
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error back-propagation algorithm finally showed as a solution suitable for 
the application. The topology selection is directly related to the 
development environment and application equipment essential for the 
detection system function. The description of application equipment 
parameters for the module development is the basis of the chapter. 
The issue of the training and testing data group and subsequent 
solution to the selected data elements conversion is described in detail in 
Chapter 5.4.2. It is possible to utilize more ways to simulate and generate 
incorrect packets. From all the possibilities mentioned, I selected the 
combined solution, which is the combination of real communication in 
a real network and random generation of non-standard data packets. Such 
simulated communication was then stored in the database on a local device. 
To convert the recorded data for module input of the neural network, as well 
as for easy and fast development of the training and testing set, it was 
necessary to develop software operating as a conversion bridge.  
After developing and recording of needed data, the last step of neural 
network implementation follows. Experiments and simulation were carried 
out in the environment of available simulation programs. The proposal 
developed more neural networks with a different number of neurons in the 
covered layer and similarly different activation functions. The results of the 
experiments are illustrated in graphs in Chapter 5.4.3. 
The subsequent verification of the proposed solution showed (Chapter 
5.5), that the proposed and trained neural network is able to sufficiently 
classify individual data packets within the determined tolerance. This 
proved the possibility of artificial intelligence technologies application in 
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solving matters related to the verification of data transfers in control and 
communication networks.   
The final test of the proposed network was in testing two samples, 
where each of them comprised 3,000 data elements. The results show 
(Chapter 5.5), that the parameter type in the data flow, or possibly in  the 
anomaly to be detected by the system, depend only on the development of 
a suitable training set and subsequent neural network training.  
6.1 Possibilities of further development 
Regarding the overall extent and complexity of data 
transfers/transports in control and industrial data networks, this monograph 
and its results represent only the introduction to investigation in the field. 
The following points can be subjects of further research: 
 Propose significantly larger neural network that will be able to 
classify incoming packets into more classes. Then it would be 
possible to distinguish the transferred data and subsequently react 
to detected anomalies with higher accuracy. Obviously, this step 
assumes the development of a significantly larger training set of 
samples and extension of conversion tables mentioned in the 
monograph as well as other elements. 
 Develop software able to generate the training set automatically on 
the basis of requirements and ensure the whole learning process 
(training with required accuracy, scaling arrangement, activation of 
network with new parameters).   
 Improve the selection of packets sets for neural network learning 
from the recorded operation by the implementation of database 
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system via data stores technologies (39) and data mining in data 
communication records. 
 Extend the mentioned model by other neural networks, i.e. by 
more pre-processors able to detect further anomalies in data flows, 
e.g. the quantification of the transferred/transported data after 
Fourier’s transformation (covert channel detection), or possibly 
other neural networks module applicable for the preparation of 
training data set for the main detection neural network.  
 Examine the application of other neural network types in the model 
introduced, e.g. the application of mentioned Kohonen network, or 
possibly other network type without controlled learning.  
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